巴菲特1965年度信二（二）。2024-11-3

英文早读第110篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。

Investment Companies
投资公司

On the next page we bring up to date our regulare comparision with the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
在下一页我带来至今我们的常规比较与两家最大的开放投资基金（互助基金）遵守一个政策典型的95-100%投资于一般股市和两家最大的分散式封闭投资公司的结果。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Mannual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.
（1）由资产价值加上在当年记录分配给持股人的分红计算而来；
（2）从1966年的穆迪银行和财经手册1957-1965版而来。1966年上半年度预估而来。

Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its conservative nature. If "conservative" is interpreted to mean "productive of results varying only slightly from average experience" I believe the characterization is proper. Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification among high grade securities. Since, over a long period, "average experience" is likely to be good experience, there is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this from of investment medium.
机构投资的支持者经常引用他的保守性。如果“保守主意”是意味着“产出结果仅仅轻微区别于平均值”我相信这个性质是合适的。这些结果几乎绑定于高评分股票的分散度。因此，在长时期内，“平均表现”似乎是好的表现，也没有错典型投资者运用这个来自于平均投资值。

However, I believe that conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean "subject to substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value than total experience". This simply has not been achieved, as the record of the four largest funds (presently managing over 5 billion) illustrates. Specifically, the Dow declined in 1957, 1960, 1962 and the first half of 1966. Cumulating the shrinkage in the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline of 20.6%. Following a similar technique for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7%, 20.9%, 22.3% and 24.6%. Including the interim performance for the first half of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the funds declines of 14.4%, 23.1%, 27.1% and 30.6%. Such funds (and I believe their results are quite typical of institutional experience in common stocks) seem to meet the first definition of conservatism but not the second one.
然而，我相信保守主义更适合于诠释“处于大幅少的临时或永久性价值缩水相比于整体经历”。这很简单还没有实现，根据四家最大基金的记录（现在管理着超过50亿美金）展现的。尤其，道琼斯在1957年，1960年，1962年和1966年上半年度下跌时。道琼斯在这三个整年累计缩水产生了20.6%的下跌。这四家最大的基金遵循相似的技术产生下跌9.7，20.9%，22.3%和24.6%。包括1966年上半年度期中表现的话道琼斯结果下跌27.5%且这些基金下跌14.4%，23.1%，27.1%和30.6%。这些基金（我相信他们的结果是在一般股票机构经历的非常典型代表）似乎满足保守主义的第一个定义而不是第二个。

Most investors would climb a rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the above two interpretations of conservatism. The first might be better labeled "conventionalism" - what it really says is that "when others are making money in the general run of securities, so will we and to about the same degree; when they are losing money, we'll do it at about the same rate." This is not to be equated with "when others are making it, we'll make as much and when they are losing it, we will lose less." Very few investment programs accomplish the latter - we certainly don't promise it but we do intend to keep trying. (I have always felt our objectives should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated during the desperate years when Yale was losing eight games a season. Said Herman, "I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.")
绝大多数投资者将会间歇性的爬上一个台阶如果他们清楚的诠释上面这两个保守主义的表述。第一个似乎更合适标记为“传统主义”——他真正意义是说“当其他人在股市一般运作中赚钱时，我也赚钱并且差不多程度；当其他人在亏钱时，我也是以差不多速度。”这不应该等同于“当其他人赚钱时，我赚的同样多并且当他们亏钱时，我亏的少。”很少有投资组织实现了后者——我们当然不保证他但是我们试图试一试。（我经常感觉我们的目标应该某种程度更高烧相比于赫曼黒克曼表达的在令人绝望的年份当耶鲁在一个赛季输了八场比赛。赫曼说“我看我的工作室保持校友们郁郁寡欢而不是暴动起来。”）

6.proponent：倡导者；支持者；拥护者
7.cite：引用；援引；列举；提及；传唤
8.interpret：解释；口译；诠释；说明
9.subject to：从属于；使服从；处于…中
10.rung：横档；梯子的梯级
11.intellectually：间歇性地
12.delineate：勾画；描述；描画；解释
13.interpretation：解释；理解；说明
14.conventionalism：传统主义
15.loftier：崇高的；高尚的；傲慢的
16.articulate：表达；明确表达；清楚说明
17.desperate：不惜冒险的；不顾一切的；绝望的；孤注一掷的
18.alumni：校友；毕业生
19.sullen：赌气的；郁郁寡欢的；愠怒的
20.mutinous：叛变的；参与叛乱的；参与暴动的