第14章 对现代生活的全面思考：自然、宗教、艺术和绝对(2)

第14章 对现代生活的全面思考：自然、宗教、艺术和绝对(2)

But since the reproduction of the species is the reason for the existence of the individual organism, the organism is ready for death after it has successfully reproduced the species. In the lower animals, this occurs shortly after reproduction, but in the “higher animals,” because they possess a “higher independence,” death comes about by virtue of disease.The organism is finite, dependent on its nonorganic environment, and its function in the species is ultimately to reproduce the species, not itself As a finite entity, caught within the mechanical, chemical, and organic conditions of life, it cannot resist all outside causes that disrupt its functioning, and thus the necessity of disease and death is written into our very conception of organic life (so Hegel argued): The concept of disease that is prior to all empirical determination of it is that of the organism’s very functioning being thrown off center, of something external to the organism causing its organs not to work in terms of the end for which they exist as organs in the first place, namely, the maintenance of the individual organism itself The possibility of death is thus the possibility that any one of the organs can fail to play the role it is supposed to play. On its own, taken out of the context of its functioning within the organism, an individual organ cannot be said to be diseased or healthy. The whole concept of health, therefore, involves a teleological judgment about the organism as a whole, an “ideality,” in Hegel’s words.

    但是，由于类的繁殖是个体有机体生存的理由，因此有机体在成功繁殖后代后就做好了死亡的准备。在低等动物中，这种情况通常在繁殖后代后不久就会出现，而在“高等动物”中，由于它们拥有“更高的独立性”，往往会因疾病而死亡。有机体是有限的，依赖于其非有机的环境，它在类中所起的最终作用是繁殖后代而非自身存续。作为一个有限的实体，一个受机械、化学和有机生命条件制约的存在，它无法抵御所有破坏其正常功能的外部因素，因此疾病和死亡的必然性已融入我们关于有机生命的特定概念中（正如黑格尔所坚称的）：疾病概念先于所有关于疾病本身的经验确定，因此疾病概念意味着有机体偏离其特有的中心，意味着外部因素导致其器官无法按照特定目的发挥作用，而这些器官最初作为器官存在就是为了维持个体有机体本身。因此，死亡的可能性在于任何器官未能履行其应尽的职责。单独来看，脱离了在有机体内起作用的语境联系的单个器官，不能再被说成是病态的或健康的。因此，健康的整体概念涉及对有机体作为一个整体的目的论判断，用黑格尔的话说，即作为“理想性”的目的论判断。

With the concepts of the reproduction of the species and of the health and diseases of organisms, though, the proper domain of the “philosophy of nature” is, for Hegel, closed. Although everything in nature should be interpreted from the human standpoint in terms of the relative “wholes” in which the individuals of nature relate to each other, nature itself can never rise to the level of making judgments about itself.  The animal can have a “feeling” of its “universality” in the reproduction of the species, but it cannot have a “thought” about it. As natural entities, all the individuals remain subject to the laws of nature. Only in the free, rational activity of the investigators of nature, the creatures for whom these “wholes” appear, is there the possibility of the selfdeterminatton of principles and ends. Only in norm-governed, free activity does the Idea “break out of this circle and by shattering this inadequate form make room for itself.”'®

    然而，随着类繁殖的概念以及有机体健康与疾病的概念的提出，黑格尔认为“自然哲学”的适当领域至此告一段落。尽管自然界的万事万物都应从人类的角度，按照相对的“整体”来阐释，而且在“整体”中自然界个体相互关联，但自然本身永远无法上升到能够对自身做出判断的层面。动物在类的繁殖中具有一种“普遍性”的“感觉”，但它们无法对此形成“思想”。作为自然的实体，每个个体仍然服从自然法则。只有在自然研究者或那些为这些“整体”而出现的人们的自由理性活动中，才可能存在自我决定的原则和目的。只有在受规范支配的自由行动中，“观念”才会“突破这一范围，通过打破这不适当的形式为自身开辟空间”。

In his lectures on the “philosophy of nature,” Hegel indulged himself in all kinds of idiosyncratic musings on various topics of the day, often taking quite a curmudgeonly attitude toward various prevailing opinions. Some of them are amusing; he offers, for example, his own explanation for the widely held belief that the legendary European wine vintage of i8ii, which was the same year as the appearance of a visible, bright comet in the sky and which therefore became known as the “comet vintage” (and which commanded extraordinary prices until the end of the nineteenth century), was in fact due to the comet itself: “What makes comet wine so good is that the water-process detaches itself from the earth and thus brings about an altered state in the planet.”''’ Some of them seem in retrospect a bit cranky, as when Hegel denies even the possibility of explaining the differences of species by appeal to evolution. For Hegel, to explain the origin of new species or of life in terms of some natural process - as if altering one little part somewhere could produce something new - seemed untenable; one explains a species in terms of its specific ends, not in terms of how the structure of, for example, feathers or legs was brought about.Likewise, Hegel mused that water was not simply a composition of hydrogen and oxygen, despite what the chemists said on the matter.'*' On some points, he acknowledged that his views on a particular subject were not taken seriously by the natural scientists, but he claimed not to be worried about it, since he was not trying to offer an alternative to “finite” scientific explanation (even though he quite often violated that maxim in his actual lectures); with reference to his criticism of Newton, he noted, for example, that “philosophy has to start from the concept, and even if it does not assert much, we must be content with this ... I have therefore set down here only the rudiments of a rational procedure in the comprehension of the mathematical and mechanical laws of nature as this free realm of measures. This standpoint is, I know, not reflected on by professionals in the field; but a time will come when this science will require for its satisfaction the philosophical concept.”^" In terms of his philosophy of nature, Hegel remained, as he himself would have had to admit, very much a child of his times.

    在关于“自然哲学”的讲演中，黑格尔沉迷于就当时的各种话题进行独特风格的沉思，常常对各种流行观点持极其审慎的态度。其中一些沉思非常有趣，例如，在黑格尔时代，人们普遍认为，具有传奇色彩的1818年份欧洲葡萄酒实际上应归功于当年彗星的出现，就在这一年，天空中出现了一颗肉眼可见的明亮彗星，这一年因而以“彗星佳酿年”闻名（并且这一年酿造的葡萄酒价格特别昂贵，这种情况一直持续到19世纪末）。对于这种观点，黑格尔本人的解释是，这种情况实际上应归因于彗星：“使彗星葡萄酒成为绝世佳酿的原因，在于水的过程与土地分离，从而导致行星状态的改变。”其中一些沉思如今看来有些奇特，比如当时黑格尔甚至否认科学家通过诉诸进化来解释物种差异。对于黑格尔而言，根据某种自然过程来解释新类或生命的起源——仿佛改变某处的一小部分就能产生某种新事物——似乎站不住脚。一个人应该根据类的特殊目的来解释类，而不应根据诸如羽毛或腿的形成结构来解释类。同样，黑格尔经过深思熟虑后认为，水不仅仅是氢和氧的合成物，无论化学家们对此有何说法。在一些观点上，他承认自己关于具体问题的看法未被当时的自然科学家重视，但他声称自己并不担心，因为他并非试图为人们提供对“有限的”科学解释的替代方案（尽管他几乎在每次实际讲演中都违背了这条准则）。例如，就他对牛顿的批评而言，他强调“哲学必须从概念开始，纵使哲学没有做出太多断言，我们也必定对此感到满意……因此我在这里只是奠定了理解数学力学自然规律这个自由度量领域的合理考察方式的基础。我深知这个观点未被该领域的专家深入思考，但将来会有一个时期，人们会为这门科学要求理性概念。”在自然哲学方面，黑格尔让我们看到，在他所处的时代，他的思想或许仍显稚嫩，就像他自己可能也不得不承认的那样。

The goals of Hegel’s “philosophy of nature” were, whatever the failures of his own rather singular rendition of the subject, nonetheless consistent with his modernism. He wanted to construct an understanding of nature that would do service in the modern self-understanding of European culture, that would bring together the ideals of freedom driving the revolutions in European life — both political and industrial — with the ideals of the scientific investigation of nature. He was quite clear that he was not claiming to explain the processes of nature in terms of some obscure spiritual construction of the world; as he emphasized to his students, “spirit is no less before than after nature . . . spirit, just because it is the goal of nature, is prior to it, nature has proceeded from spirit: not empirically, however, but in such a manner that spirit is already from the very first contained in nature, which is spirit’s own presupposition.”^'

    黑格尔“自然哲学”的目标在于，无论他对特定问题的奇特解释多么不成功，他依然与自己的现代主义理念保持一致。他想要构建一种对自然的理解，这种理解将服务于现代欧洲文化的自我认知，将促进欧洲人生活革命的自由理想——无论是政治的还是工业的理想——与对自然的科学研究理想相结合。他清楚地认识到，不应主张按照某种晦涩的精神建构来解释自然过程。正如他向学生强调的：“精神既先于自然界存在，也后于自然界存在……精神，正因为它是自然的目标，所以先于自然，自然界是由精神产生的，然而并非以经验方式产生，而是以这样的方式产生，即精神以自然界为前提，始终已包含于自然界之中。”

Hegel also had other goals in constructing his philosophy of nature.  To comprehend the “whole” as a way in which nature in all its protean multiplicity is constructed of processes that produce a planet on which rational, self-conscious life - Geist, spirit, mind - emerges is in fact to understand nature religiously, to know God “in this his immediate existence.But in saying this, Hegel makes it clear that he does not hold the orthodox view that God created the world with certain ends in mind, nor does he think that God actually consciously guides any of the processes of nature, nor that God just is nature. Moreover, God can also not be understood as a “supernatural” entity outside of the world.  Rather, God exists only in the world’s existing and coming to have the shape it does by virtue of its own internal teleology, which can only manifest itself in terms of the emergence of spirit, of human life historically coming to reflect on itself The view of nature as a whole required also, Hegel firmly believed, a fully modernist religious sensibility, a theme and concern that had occupied him on and off since his student days in Tubingen.

    此外，黑格尔在构建自然哲学时还有另一个目的。把“整体”当作一种方式来理解（并且以这种方式，自然因其所有潜在的多样性而被构建为某些过程，这些过程产生了一颗有理性的、自觉的生命——Geist，精神、心灵——出现的行星），实际上就是以宗教的方式理解自然，就是“以这种直接的生存”来认识上帝。但在提及这一点时，黑格尔明确阐明，他并不认同上帝因内心怀有某些目的而创造世界的正统观点，而且他认为，上帝实际上并非有意识地引导自然的任何发展，上帝恰恰不是自然本身。再者，上帝也不能被理解为世界之外的“超自然”实体。确切地说，上帝的存在仅在于世界的存在以及世界开始具有特定的形式，世界凭借其内在目的论而具有形式，世界只能通过精神的出现以及历史上开始自我反思的人类生活的出现来展现自身。黑格尔坚信，因此对自然整体的看法还需要一种充分现代主义的宗教敏感性，自他在图宾根求学时代起，对这个话题的关注就时常萦绕在他心头。

The Philosophy of Religion

The Background to the Lectures

At the same time that the natural scientists were making a play for more authority in the university, the traditional claims of the theology faculty to be central to the mission of the institution had never really completely disappeared. In part to counter his disputes with the theologians (especially Schleiermacher), Hegel, the former seminarian, found himself for the first time in his life giving lectures in Berlin on the philosophy of religion. His reasons for doing so were, however, clearly more than merely prudential, merely a way to fend off his enemies; this was a subject that had occupied him for all his life, and his attitudes toward it had probably undergone more swings and changes than had his attitudes toward anything else in his life.

宗教哲学

讲演的背景

    与此同时，部分自然科学家挖空心思提升自己在大学中的权威地位，而传统上要求神学院教职员工担当起学校使命的主张也从未间断。部分出于反驳神学家（特别是施莱尔马赫）与他的争论，身为前神学院学生的黑格尔，生平首次在柏林开设关于宗教哲学的讲演课程。不过，他这样做的理由显然并非仅仅出于谨慎，也不只是为了以某种方式避开敌人。宗教哲学是他一生都在探讨的话题，相较于他对其他事物的态度，他对宗教哲学的态度显得更为摇摆不定、变化多端。

Although the basic rudiments of Hegel’s overall philosophy of religion had not changed since his long chapter on religion in the Phenomenology^ much of the detail and the nature of the historical and conceptual accounts did indeed change and develop. Hegel did not simply dredge up his old account and lecture on it, nor did he simply “apply” his logical categories to religious material; he continued to develop his thoughts on religion both in terms of how it was to be given a mssenschaftlich, or “theoretically rigorous,” account in the context of his own “system,” and, most importantly, with how a fully modern religion could be understood.

    尽管公允地说，自黑格尔在《精神现象学》中对宗教进行长篇阐述的章节起，其全部宗教哲学的基本原理便未曾改变。然而，在历史与观念阐释的诸多细节和本质方面，确实发生了变化与发展。黑格尔既没有简单地重拾旧有论述并以此讲演，也没有单纯地将逻辑范畴“应用”于宗教材料。他持续阐发自己关于宗教的思想，既依据宗教在其“体系”语境中应如何获得科学或“理论严谨”的阐释，更重要的是，依据如何从充分现代的角度理解宗教。

Hegel’s lectures on the topic were - like his series of lectures on the philosophy of art, the philosophy of history, and the history of philosophy - among his most successful. They were well attended and widely followed, and like the other parts of his best-attended series of lectures.  they were relatively free of the dense jargon that characterized his major philosophical works. By the end of his life, Hegel was gradually moving away from the kind of opaque prose that had characterized his earlier published works and was able to formulate his views in a much more elegant and accessible manner. However, he did not publish the lectures nor make any plans for publication of them in his lifetime. Only after his death did his friends gather up his own lecture manuscripts and the various copies of student notes and render them into publishable form.  In fact, his lectures on the philosophy of religion were the very first of Hegel’s great posthumous works to be edited and published, and it was these works that both helped to cement the influence of “Hegelianism” after his death and that provoked the initial firestorm over his legacy.  (Hegel himself, however, was not silent publicly about the issue in his lifetime; besides the long chapter in the Phenomenology and the cryptic paragraphs in the Encyclopedia, Hegel stated his views in his preface to Hinrichs’s book on the philosophy of religion, and he outlined his views on Indian religion in his review of Humboldt’s book on the Baghvad Gita in xP/t Jahrbiicher fur wissenschaftliche Kritik in 1827.)

    黑格尔关于该话题的讲演，如同他就艺术哲学、历史哲学、哲学史所做的系列讲演一样，是他最为成功的讲演之一。这些讲演座无虚席，备受追捧。而且，与他其他最受欢迎的系列讲演一样，宗教哲学讲演相对较少使用那些构成他主要哲学作品特征的晦涩术语。到了晚年，黑格尔逐渐摒弃了早期作品中晦涩难懂的散文风格，能够以一种更为优雅、易懂的方式系统阐述自己的见解。然而，他生前并未发表这批讲演稿，也没有将其付梓的计划。直到他去世后，朋友们才收集了他的讲演手稿以及学生的各类笔记，并编辑出版。实际上，黑格尔关于宗教哲学的讲演，正是他逝世后友人编辑出版的大量遗著中的第一批，而正是这些作品，既扩大了“黑格尔哲学”在他身后的影响，也引发了关于他遗产的最初争议。（不过，黑格尔本人在世时也公开谈及过宗教哲学问题。除了《精神现象学》中的长篇阐述以及《哲学科学全书》中含义模糊的段落外，黑格尔还在为欣里希斯宗教哲学著作所写的序言中陈述了自己对宗教哲学的看法，并在评论洪堡1827年发表于《科学批评年鉴》关于《薄伽梵歌》的著作时，概述了他对印第安人宗教的见解。）

Hegel’s own personal religious attitudes are more difficult to fathom.  He himself does not seem in his daily life to have been particularly devout, at least in any conventional way. However, his wife, Marie, certainly was, and after his death she became more and more drawn to sentimentalist religious piety. Her own memories of Hegel were of a religious man who was drawn to the Bible; but even Marie was dismayed when, after his death, she read the published lectures and discovered the philosophy contained within them to be not quite at home with her own religious views, and she even expressed some irritation at Rosenkranz’s discussions of Hegel’s earlier theological studies in his biography of Hegel, which, from her point of view, contained too many things that were “vexatious for faith.Marie Hegel claimed that Hegel’s favorite biblical citation was Matthew 5:8 - “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God” - and Hegel certainly liked quoting that passage in his lectures; but he also gave it a much different twist than we would imagine Marie did.^-^ He also once simply finessed the issue of personal immortality with Marie; when she asked him what he thought of it, he simply without speaking pointed to the Bible, which she of course interpreted in her own way.^^ It does seem to be the case, though, that Hegel had a religious sentiment of sorts; it was not some- thing that was foreign to him, and he was not feigning religiosity when he spoke of it.

    黑格尔本人对宗教的态度难以捉摸。在日常生活中，他似乎并未表现出特别的虔诚，至少没有以传统方式展现出虔诚。不过，他的妻子玛丽无疑非常虔诚，在他去世后，她愈发受到感伤主义宗教虔诚的吸引。在她的记忆中，黑格尔是一个受《圣经》吸引的信教之人。然而，就连玛丽也大为惊愕，因为在黑格尔去世后，她阅读他已发表的讲演稿，发现其中包含的哲学与她自己的宗教观点大相径庭。她甚至对罗森克兰茨在黑格尔传记中关于黑格尔早期神学研究的讨论表示出某种恼怒，因为从她的观点来看，这样的讨论包含了太多“令信仰者恼火”的内容。玛丽·黑格尔声称，黑格尔最喜欢的《圣经》引文是《马太福音》第5章第8句——“清心的人有福了，因为他们必得见神”。黑格尔无疑喜欢在讲演中引用包含这句话的段落，但与我们通常认为玛丽对这句话的理解不同，黑格尔对其进行了截然不同的解读。此外，对于玛丽询问的关于个人不朽的问题，他只是巧妙应对。当她问他对此问题的看法时，他发表意见时丝毫未提及《圣经》，对此，她当然只能以自己的方式去理解。不过，事实确实是黑格尔怀有多种宗教情感。在他看来，宗教并非某种陌生之物，他谈及宗教时也并非假装笃信。

Nonetheless, it is quite clear that in Hegel’s own mind, the philosophy of religion was crucial to his enterprise. If nothing else, how his philosophy of “freedom” and “self-determining thought” was to be squared with any account of religion in which God played an independent role was hard to see for many people; and charges of “pantheism” (and, given the current of the time, what was taken as its implication, “atheism”) with regard to Hegel’s attitudes toward religion were never far below the surface and in the later years of his life were being openly made against his philosophy.

    然而，十分明确的是，在黑格尔自己心中，宗教哲学对他的事业至关重要。即便没有其他方面的差异，他的“自由”哲学和“自我确定思想”哲学，如何与上帝在其中扮演独立角色的宗教阐释相一致，这一点让很多人难以理解。黑格尔受到的“泛神论”指责（鉴于当时的思潮，通常被视为泛神论含义的即“无神论”），关系到他对待宗教的态度，这种指责一直存在，甚至在他在世的最后几年，还引发了人们对他哲学的公开反对。

Religious Reflection

Religion in Hegel’s understanding is one of three basic practices within which people come to be aware of and to reflect upon humanity’s highest interests - in Hegel’s language, to reflect on “absolute content,” “absolute essence.” Art and philosophy also perform this role, but religion does it in its own particular way that cannot be reduced to aesthetic experience or conceptual reflection. In religion, one attempts to “elevate” oneself to the divine by a communal reflection on what is essentially at stake in life, and in being so elevated, one seeks to experience a “unity” with the divine. One achieves a form of reflective selfconsciousness about “universal” matters that transcends one’s own particular interests and viewpoint, even in principle the viewpoint of one’s own culture. Religion achieves this through rite, ritual, and (symbolic) representation {Vorstellung)}^ In particular, religious reflection implicitly commits one to an identification with what is “absolutely” true that in its ideal form does not involve alienating one’s own deepest interests and aspirations from this experience of the “absolute,” of what is normatively authoritative for how one is to lead one’s life and to reflect on the meaning of the full range of life - its full and deepest emotional, intellectual, and practical content.

宗教反思

    在黑格尔的理解中，宗教是三种基本实践之一。在这类实践领域中，人们开始意识到并反思人类的最高利益——用黑格尔的话说，人们着手反思“绝对内容”或“绝对本质”。艺术和哲学同样发挥着这样的作用，但宗教以其独特的方式履行这一职责，其方式无法简化为审美经验或概念反思。在宗教中，个体试图通过对本质上使生命产生问题的事物进行共同反思，从而“提升”自己至神的高度，并通过这种提升，试图体验与神的“统一”。个体达成一种关于“普遍”事物的反思性自我意识形式，这种形式超越了个体自身的特殊利益和观点，甚至在原则上超越了个体自身的文化视角。宗教通过礼拜、宗教仪式和（象征的）表象（Vorstellung）来实现这一点。特别是，宗教反思含蓄地使人认同与作为“绝对”真理的事物的统一，以理想的形式，这种统一不会使个体自己最深层的利益和渴望，与关于“绝对”的体验、与关于个体应如何引导自己生活以及反思生活领域意义（生活的全面且最深层的情感、知识和实践内容）的具有必不可少权威性的体验相疏离。

Although philosophical reflection can also be oriented toward the “absolute” as that which is inherently authoritative for us, and indeed is better suited than religious reflection to grasp the true content of such reflection, it cannot substitute for religion. As Hegel made it pointedly clear in his 1827 lectures: “Religion is for everyone. It is not philosophy.  which is not for everyone. Religion is the manner or mode by which all human beings become conscious of truth for themselves.”^’ By this Hegel certainly did not mean that religion is to be regarded as a kind of lower-order social practice that has some utility in the way it sugarcoats the more pristine truths found in philosophy. Religion is the experiential “elevation” of oneself to the divine; philosophy can do this only in “thought,” and cannot in principle provide the same kind of emotional, personal identification with the divine that genuine religion can.

    哲学反思同样可以指向“绝对”（这里的“绝对”对我们而言具有内在的权威性，并且确实比宗教反思更适合人们把握这种反思的真实内容），但哲学反思无法取代宗教。正如黑格尔在1827年的讲演中极力阐明的：“宗教是为每个人的。它不是哲学，因为哲学并非为每个人。宗教是一种方式，借此每个人都能意识到对于他们自己的真理。”通过这一论述，黑格尔无疑并非意指宗教应被视为一种较低层次的社会实践，这种实践仅在某个方面具有功用，使哲学中更为质朴的真理更易于被接受。宗教是经验层面上自我向神的“提升”；哲学只能凭借“思想”做到这一点，并且大体上无法提供与神在情感和个人层面的认同，而真正的宗教则能够提供这种个人认同。

The basic issue animating Hegel’s mature philosophy of religion was how such “elevation” and “unity” with the divine could be reconciled to modern life, and his answer proved to be his most controversial.  God, so Hegel argued, is spirit, Geist, and the “elevation” to God therefore is an “elevation” to what humans really are, namely, minded and like-minded norm-bound creatures, whose highest interests are to be found in articulating and understanding their own self-consciousness in terms of rational principles. In the language of Hegel’s philosophy, humans only “become” spirit when they become norm-bound, selfconscious entities, and they can do this only in a fully social manner (in terms of structures of mutual recognition and the like); they become “spirit,” that is, not just by virtue of being organisms but in becoming aware of themselves as norm-bound creatures, as self-consciously conceiving of themselves as “one of us” and as “one among many”: “Spirit,” Hegel says in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, “is spirit only insofar as it is for spirit. This is what constitutes the concept of spirit itself.’”* God cannot therefore be adequately conceived as a being “transcendent” to such human “minded” and “like-minded” life.  As Hegel sharply phrased it in one of his many formulations of the issue: “God’s spirit is [present] essentially in his community; God is spirit only insofar as God is in his community.”’’

    赋予黑格尔成熟宗教哲学活力的基本问题是：与神的“提升”和“统一”如何与现代生活相协调，而他的答案被证明是最具争议之处。因此，黑格尔坚称，上帝即精神（Geist），向上帝的“提升”因此是向人类真正本质的“提升”，也就是向具有精神或类似精神、受规范约束的人的“提升”，他们的最高利益在于依据合理的原理来系统阐述和理解自身的自我意识。用黑格尔的哲学话语来说，人类在成为受规范约束、具有自我意识的存在时，才“变成”精神性的存在，而且他们只能以一种完全社会性的方式（按照相互认知的结构等）来实现这一点。他们变成“精神”，并非仅仅因为他们是有机体，而是因为他们意识到自己是受规范约束的生物，自觉地将自己设想为“我们中的一员”以及“多中之一”。黑格尔在关于宗教哲学的讲演中说：“精神只有在它为了精神的范围内才是精神。这就是构成精神本身这个概念的要素。”因此，上帝不能被恰当地设想为超越这种“具有思想”和“类似思想”的人类生命的“超验之物”。正如黑格尔在关于该问题的众多系统阐述之一中尖锐表述的：“上帝的精神仅本质上[呈现]于他的共同体中；上帝仅在上帝存在于他的共同体的范围内才是精神。”

The “Phenomenology” of Religion

Hegel’s own concept of religion was thus very closely linked to his philosophy of nature and to his conception of how “spirit” emerges from nature. God is not “outside” the world; that would make Him “finite,” bounded by an “other” to Himself. God is instead to be found in the “principle” of the world itself. Nature - from the organization of the solar system to the “meteorological process” that makes earth into a planet capable of sustaining life - is to be understood in terms of what is necessary for life in general, and for rational, self-conscious life in particular to be possible and actual. God is therefore not some “outside” force or entity directing nature to a certain end; God, as spirit, is already metaphorically asleep in nature, and the divine principle of “spirit” comes to fruition only as humans appear on the planet and create religions as the modes of social practice in which reflection on their relation to nature, each other, and to the divine principle itself is carried out. In the creation of the religious community, spirit, as it were, wakes up from its natural slumber and becomes conscious of itself. In holding this view, Hegel clearly did not hold (as did later French positivists) that humanity was identical to God, or that worship in church was or should be really worship of humanity. Humanity did not create the world; rather, the world was so eternally structured so that it was necessary that life appear on earth, that humanity come to exist, and in and through humanity’s religious practices, God, the divine structure, “wakes up” and comes to be aware of Himself. Without humanity, God would be, as it were, still asleep in nature, unaware of His own existence.

宗教“现象学”

    黑格尔关于宗教的概念，与他的自然哲学以及他关于“精神”如何从自然中产生的观念紧密相连。上帝并非“在”世界“之外”，这种观点可能会使上帝变成“有限之物”，使上帝本身受到“他者”的限制。相反，上帝应体现在世界本身的“原则”之中。大自然——从太阳系的构成到“气象过程”（后者使地球成为一颗能够维持生命的行星）——应依据对一般生命、具有理性的自觉生命，特别是对可能的和实际的生命所必需的条件来理解。因此，上帝并非某种指引自然达到特定目的的“外部”力量或存在。上帝作为精神，已隐喻性地在自然中沉睡，而“精神”的神圣原理只有在人类诞生于地球，并创造出作为社会实践模式的宗教之时才得以实现。通过这种社会实践模式，人们反思宗教与自然、宗教与自然彼此之间的关系，以及宗教与神圣原理本身的关系。在创造宗教共同体的过程中，在某种程度上，精神从自然的沉睡中苏醒，并开始意识到自身。基于这种观点，黑格尔显然认为（如同后来法国实证主义哲学家们所认为的）人类不同于上帝，或者说宗教崇拜实际上或应该真正是对人类的崇拜。人类没有创造世界；恰恰相反，世界如此永恒地建构，以至于生命必然在地球上出现，人类必然存在。通过人类的宗教实践，上帝这一神圣结构才“苏醒”并意识到自身。可以说，如果没有人类，上帝或许仍在自然中沉睡，或许仍意识不到自己的存在。

In Hegel’s own day, there were two obvious charges to be made against such a view. First, there was the serious charge that Hegel’s doctrine was only pantheism by another name and, in the equation often made at the time, would therefore be equivalent to atheism. Second, there was the charge that whatever else it was, the view was simply not Christian; and, indeed, the view did sound suspiciously pagan and Aristotelian in the way it spoke of the unity of divinity and reason.^” Both those charges were heating up in Hegel’s day, and he needed to respond to both of them.

    在黑格尔所处的时代，显然有两种不利于这种观点的指责。第一种严肃的指责是，黑格尔的学说只不过是泛神论的代名词，由于当时泛神论常常被等同于无神论，黑格尔的学说因此可能被等同于无神论。第二种指责是，无论这种观点是什么，它都不仅仅是基督教徒的观点；更确切地说，由于这种观点谈及神性与理性统一的方式，它听起来确实令人怀疑是异教徒和亚里士多德哲学的观点。上述两种指责在黑格尔的时代被大肆宣扬，因此他需要对这两种指责做出回应。

In one sense, Hegel simply finessed the pantheism charge by dismissing it. He asserted that taken literally, the whole idea of pantheism that God was in everything - is simply ludicrous: As he told his audience, “It has never occurred to anyone to say that everything, all individual things collectively, in their individuality and contingency, are God - for example, that paper or this table is God.”-^' What is divine in all things is their essence, and God must be understood as “subjectivity,” as the divine principle of reason, not as the abstract “stuff’ out of which all things are made.

    从某种意义上说，黑格尔只是通过不理会泛神论的指责来巧妙应对。黑格尔断言，从字面意义理解，泛神论的完整含义——上帝存在于一切事物中——简直荒谬可笑。他告诉听众：“在所有人看来，从未听过这样的说法：一切事物，所有个体之物，就其个性和偶然性而言，统统都是上帝——例如，这张纸或这张桌子是上帝。”一切事物中的神圣之物是事物的本质，而上帝必须被理解为“主体性”，必须被理解为理性的神圣原理，而不应被理解为一切事物由之构成的抽象“原料”。

For such a conception to work, Hegel realized that he needed to provide a full “phenomenology” of religion, a historical and dialectical account of the development of religious truth as that which is required by virtue of the failures of earlier religious reflections, such that (Protestant) Christianity emerges not as just one religion among many but as the paradigmatic modern religion, the only religion that is true, is consistent with modern social, political, and scientific life - Christianity was to be, as he described it, the “consummate religion.” To show this, Hegel knew he had to show that the alternatives - including Indian and Chinese religions - were incapable of being “modern” and involved the kinds of internal strains and incoherences that conceptually required a resolution in something like modern Protestant Christianity.

    对于这样一种有影响力的观点，黑格尔认识到他需要提供一门充分的宗教“现象学”，需要对宗教真理的发展做出历史的、辩证的阐释。这一需求源于早期宗教反思的失败，因此（新教）基督教不应仅仅被视为众多宗教中的一种，而应表现为具有范式意义的现代宗教，表现为唯一真实的、与现代社会生活、政治生活和科学生活相一致的宗教——基督教应成为“完美的宗教”，正如黑格尔所描述的那样。为了说明这一点，黑格尔明白他必须展示某些宗教选择——包括印度宗教和中国宗教——不可能是“现代的”宗教，必须展示这些选择涉及种种内在张力和不连贯性，从概念上讲，这就需要一种类似现代新教基督教的解决方案。

From the "One That Is AW’ to the Greek Religion of Beauty

This required him to make a demarcation of all religions very similar to the classification made in the original Phenomenology of Spirit. The philosophy of religion thus begins with an account of religious reflection in its “immediacy,” in what he calls “nature religion.” In identifying the divine with the natural, the followers of “nature religions” undertake a set of commitments to a conception of divinity that cannot be consistently carried out and lived through; although they revere implicitly the principle of Geist, they can only understand it as some kind of natural force. In its most “immediate” and least articulated forms, this works itself out as “magic,” as the notion that some humans can achieve a power and dominion over nature by virtue of their communion with and manipulation of its spiritual powers. Hegel identified Daoism in China and all African religions with such views.

从“作为大全的太一”到希腊人的优美宗教

    这就要求他对所有宗教进行划分，这种划分与他最初在《精神现象学》中所做的分类类似。因此，宗教哲学首先阐释宗教反思的“直接性”，即他所称的“自然宗教”。在将神等同于自然时，“自然宗教”的追随者们对神性观念做出了一系列承诺，但这些承诺无法一以贯之。他们含蓄地尊崇精神原则，但只能将其理解为某种自然力量。以最为“直接”且几乎未经系统阐述的形式，这种观念表现为“魔法”，并使人产生这样的想法：某些人能够凭借与自然精神力量的沟通和掌控，实现对自然的统治与支配。黑格尔认为中国道教和所有非洲宗教都持有这样的见解。

Hegel’s understanding of Eastern religions saw them as essentially stalled versions of what was later to develop in the West. They displayed a sense of the unity of the world as having to do with nature and spirit, but their development, Hegel thought, rarely got beyond anything more than a vague intuition of that unity. Interestingly, though, he also vehemently argued against simply dismissing them as “premodern,” or as merely being “superstitions”: With regard to Tibetan religion and its veneration of the Dalai Lama, he noted, for example, that “it is easy to say that such a religion is just senseless and irrational. What is not so easy is to recognize the necessity and truth of such religious forms, their connection with reason; and seeing that is a more difficult task than declaring something to be senseless.

    黑格尔对东方宗教的理解，本质上是将东方宗教视为后来西方宗教中发展出的事物的延迟版本。东方宗教展示了与自然和精神相关的世界统一观念，但黑格尔认为东方宗教的发展几乎无法超越一种关于统一的模糊直觉。不过，有趣的是，他也极力反对简单地将东方宗教归为“前现代之物”，或仅仅将它们视为“迷信之物”。例如，对于西藏的宗教及其对达赖喇嘛的崇敬，他强调：“很容易说这样一种宗教仅仅是无意识且无理性的。但是，要认识到这种宗教形式的必然性和真理，以及这种宗教与理性的联系，却是一件颇费力气的事；要明白这一点，是一项艰巨的任务，远比宣称某物是无意识的要难得多。”

There was also a further point to his discussion of Eastern religion as a “stalled” version of what was to develop in the West. In his 1827 lectures on Eastern religions, Hegel returned to the themes of his youth that he had shared with Schelling and Holderlin in Tubingen. Such Eastern religions exhibit, he says, the notion of '‘‘‘Hen Kai Pan,’’’’ of the “one” that is “all,” and they therefore tend to foster “tranquility, obedience, and gentleness.” Indeed, Hegel argued, if one is looking for pantheism, one will find it instantiated in Eastern religions. Such religions have the idea that God is the “substance” of all that is (that the universe is so arranged so as to produce self-conscious life on earth), but they cannot have the idea that God is “subject.” Eastern religions conceive Him as the unity of everything that is, but God is more correctly conceived as the principle of Geist itself, as that in terms of which we retrospectively understand the universe to have as its consummation. (Which is not to say that anything in the universe actually aims at such a conclusion; Hegel is quite clear that there are no intentional “actors” designing the universe so that it culminates in God’s appearance in His religious communities; it is merely the way in which we must, so he argues, conceive of the unity of the world as structured so as to produce self-conscious life, and that this intrinsic structuring is what is “divine.”) Developed into a conceptual form, such Eastern pantheism becomes Spinozism, which, because of its arid conceptual nature cannot serve as a “folk religion” or serve as the basis for a genuine “faith.With those observations, Hegel thought he had fairly well answered the charges of “pantheism” swirling around him; and he had brought to closure some of his own earliest thoughts and concerns on the issue.

    对于将东方宗教视为西方宗教发展出之物的“延迟”版本这一讨论，黑格尔还有着更为深刻的思考。在1827年关于东方宗教的讲演中，黑格尔回到了他年轻时在图宾根时期与谢林和荷尔德林共同探讨的话题。他说，这样的东方宗教展示了“Hen kai Pan”这个理念，即“作为大全的太一”的理念，因此东方宗教易于培养人们变得“平静”“顺从”和“温和”。实际上，黑格尔论证道，如果有人寻找泛神论的例子，会在东方宗教中找到。这类宗教的理念在于，上帝是一切存在者的“实体”（在于宇宙被精妙地安排，以便地球上产生具有自我意识的生命），但东方宗教不具备上帝是“主体”的观念。东方宗教将上帝设想为现存所有事物的统一体，而上帝应更准确地被设想为精神自身的原则，就像我们在回顾时，将宇宙理解为具有最终目的的事物那样来设想上帝。（不应说宇宙中的任何事物实际上都旨在实现这样一个结果；黑格尔非常清楚，根本不存在有意设计宇宙的“行动者”，所以当上帝在自己的宗教共同体中显现时，宇宙便达到了顶峰。因此，黑格尔论证道，这纯粹是一种方式，我们必须借助这种方式，将世界的统一设想为被建构出来以产生具有自我意识的生命，我们必须设想这种“内在”的建构意味着什么是“神物”。）在被阐述为一种概念形式后，这种东方泛神论就变成了斯宾诺莎的学说。由于其枯燥的概念性质，这种东方泛神论既不能用作一种“平民宗教”，也不能作为真正“信仰”的基础。通过这样的观察，黑格尔自认为已很好地回应了笼罩在他周围的“泛神论”指责；他也结束了自己早期在这个问题上的某些想法和关注。

The Persian religion of light and the ancient Egyptian religion serve to make the transition to more developed, “subjective” religions, to break free of the stalled pantheisms of the East and set in motion the developments that would culminate in Christianity. In all forms of pantheism, the commitment to an understanding of the divine as the “one that is all” breaks apart under the difficulties of sustaining and making sense of the various incoherences and tensions that are intrinsic to such conceptions, in particular the problem of understanding how evil is possible in the world. Egyptian religion, however, with its attendant myths of Osiris dying, being restored to life, and then judging in the realm of the dead, displays a vague sense (an inner, merely “symbolic” sense, Hegel says, employing the terms of his good friend Creuzer) of the way in which the “good” has the power to enforce its authority. It is a power of judgment and the ability to make those judgments effective, actual, that characterize Osiris’s actions. In Egyptian religion, the natural and the spiritual thus become conceptually distinguished, although still in an unclear way; Egyptian religion thus remains purely “symbolic” and embodies an enigma, a riddle {Rdtsel), at its heart, a sense of what it is trying to assert coupled with a lack of the conceptual means to make that assertion fully explicit and “transparent.”

    波斯人的圣灵亮光宗教和古埃及人的宗教，适合促成向更为发达的“主观的”宗教过渡，摆脱延迟发展的东方泛神论，并开启通常在基督教中达到高潮的发展进程。在所有泛神论形式中，将神理解为“作为大全的太一”这一承诺，受到某些难题的束缚（这些难题使得人们维持并理解这一概念所固有的各种不一致和张力变得困难），特别是让人难以领悟世界的存在方式。然而，古埃及人的宗教包含垂死的奥利西斯复活的神话，并且在死亡领域进行审判，从而展现出某种模糊观念（一种内在的纯粹“象征性”观念，黑格尔在此引用了他好友克罗伊策尔的术语），按照这种观念，“善良的人”有权力行使权威。正是审判的力量以及使这些审判更有效、更真实的能力，成为地狱判官行为的特点。在古埃及人的宗教中，自然和精神在概念上已有所区分，尽管这种区分仍不明确；埃及人的宗教因此仍包含纯粹的“象征”，呈现出一种谜团，一个谜（Ratsel），本质上体现了那种试图断言与缺乏概念方法相结合之物的观念，而概念方法意味着使这个断言变得详尽且“清晰”。

The tensions inherent in the “enigma” of Egyptian religion thus require a move to the “religion of beauty” of ancient Greece to resolve them. Hegel thus reprieves and elaborates on the idea already developed in the Phenomenology, that beauty and religious truth fused in ancient Greek religious practice, that the form of reflection on mankind’s highest interests in enigmatic Egyptian religion made it necessary for humanity to think of its highest interests in a more developed way that clearly distinguished the spiritual from the natural, and the Greek casting of divinity into the form of beauty allowed them to do that. The gods of Greece were thus the products of artists who projected an idealized form of humanity into them. In pantheistic religions, it is never clear to what extent the interests of the divine are congruent with humanity’s interests, and often one simply has to make sacrifices or offerings to the divine to appease them or to assuage them from following out what seem to be interests contrary to human interests or even incomprehensible from a human standpoint. However, at first in Egyptian religion and then in more developed form in Greek religion, the divine’s interests and humanity’s interests are seen as having a kind of congruence with each other. This congruence could, however, only go so far; the Greek gods, being like humans but also being immortal, could not share humanity’s concern with death; and, as he had also argued in the Phenomenology, the Greek conception burdened not only humanity but also the gods with being subject to yet another force.  “fate,” blind “necessity” - which seemed to imply that the divine itself was therefore subject to a greater power than itself and was therefore perhaps not fully “divine.”

    埃及人宗教中“谜团”所固有的张力，因此需要向古希腊“优美宗教”转变，以解决这些张力。黑格尔在此暂缓详细阐述已在《精神现象学》中阐发的观点，即优美与宗教真理在古希腊宗教实践中融为一体，对古埃及人宗教中人类最高利益的反思形式，促使人类必须以更先进的方式思考自身最高利益，这种更先进的方式能清晰区分精神和自然，而希腊人将神性塑造为优美的形式，使他们得以实现这一点。希腊诸神因而成为那些将人类理想化形式投射到神身上的艺术家的创作产物。在泛神论宗教中，很难明确神的利益在何种程度上与人类利益一致，人们常常不得不为神做出牺牲或成为神的祭品，神对人类利益要求的让步方式，或者说神让人类明白其利益的方式，似乎常常与人类利益相悖，甚至从人类的角度难以理解。然而，最初在埃及人宗教中，继而在更为发达的希腊人宗教形式中，神的利益和人类的利益被视为具有相互一致的关系。但这种一致反而不太可靠；希腊人的神不仅像人类一样，而且是不朽的，却不可能像人类一样关注死亡。正如黑格尔在《精神现象学》中同时论证的，希腊人的观念中不仅包含人类，也包含诸神，而神仍然受另一种力量，即“命运”或盲目的“必然性”的支配。这似乎暗示神自身受一种比它更强大的力量支配，因此神大概并非完全“神圣”。